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Since the global financial crisis in 2008 regulatory measures have been taken to strengthen the 
international financial sector. There are however regulatory challenges that have the potential 
to destabilise the international financial sector. This article examines three of these challenges: 
Fintech, Brexit, and Emerging Markets Economies. There is currently no significant analysis 
of these issues in relation to their effect on global financial stability. This article addresses this 
gap and analyses why these issues form a threat to financial stability. Fintech is modest but 
growing exponentially and there is little regulation in place, Brexit is characterised by 
prolonged uncertainty and potentially significant negative effects on the economy, and 
Emerging Markets Economies now occupy a far larger part of the international financial sector 
than in 2008 and their potential effects on global financial stability are also significantly 
stronger. The analysis leads to the conclusion that the common threat emerging from these 
challenges is policy uncertainty which leads to increased wariness from investors, which in 
turn leads to sudden changes in capital flows. This can potentially affect international financial 
stability. To mitigate these effects a more internationally harmonised approach to policy and 
regulation is key.  
 
1. Introduction 
It has been over a decade since the eruption of the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2008. The 
GFC was characterised by the failure of large financial institutions, important contagion 
between financial institutions, and the spread of adverse consequences from the financial 
system to the real economy. The crisis has had significant ramifications for public finances, 
cross-border capital flows, trade, the world economy, and people’s living standards. In fact, its 
effects are still being felt. The severity of the GFC has revealed the main weaknesses in the 
international architecture for financial regulations. This includes preventing, managing, and 
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resolving crises in the global financial system. The global financial regulatory community 
recognised that there were major deficiencies in the way financial institutions and markets had 
been regulated. This was sufficiently demonstrated by the failure of large banks to manage risk 
and the unregulated expansion of a shadow banking system.1 Therefore, in order to rectify the 
fault lines of the financial system, financial regulators have sought to enact a fundamental set 
of financial reforms. The reforms are built on the four key elements, which were the main 
causes of the crisis: making the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets safer; making 
financial institutions more resilient; ending the problem of financial institutions being too-big-
to-fail; and transforming shadow banking into resilient market‑based finance.2 The financial 
regulators acknowledged that financial stability is the key objective of these reforms, so they 
aimed at building a more robust and resilient global financial system. In achieving the financial 
stability objective, they adopted a system-wide approach, which is based on the key elements 
of the financial system.3   
 
The evidence shows that reforms since the crisis have boosted the resilience of the financial 
system by making banks safer, reducing the risk of runs due to maturity transformation.4 
Significantly, financial regulators have been given new legal powers to effectively monitor and 
address risks that could emerge outside the regulatory boundary and manage a crisis.5  
 
While the post crisis reforms have been designed to fix the abovementioned roots and causes 
of the GFC, they do not consider emerging regulatory challenges that might threaten the 
stability of the global financial system and be potential causes of a future financial crisis. This 
article makes a novel contribution by analysing three potential regulatory challenges to 
financial stability, namely financial technology (fintech), the UK leaving the European Union 
(Brexit), and issues arising from emerging market economies (EME). While these emerging 
challenges have been addressed from different legal, financial and economic aspects, this 
 
1 See Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Understanding the Risks Inherent in Shadow Banking: 
A Primer and Practical Lessons Learned (November 2012) at <https://www.dallasfed.org/~/media/ 
documents/research/staff/staff1203.pdf> accessed 25 April 2020.  
2 The G20, ‘Global Plan for Recovery and Reform’ (2009)  
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0402.html accessed 26 August 2019. 
3 Mohammed Alshaleel, Money Market Funds Reforms in the US and the EU: The Quest for Financial Stability,’ 
31 EBLR 303 – 335 (2020).  
4 See, FSB, Implementation and Effects of the G20 Financial Regulatory Reforms ,4th Annual Report (2018) 
https://www.fsb.org/2018/11/implementation-and-effects-of-the-g20-financial-regulatory-reforms-fourth-
annual-report/ accessed 6 September 2019. 
5 FSB, Supra n.4 
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article uniquely analyses them from a financial stability perspective. Fintech, for example, has 
been subject to various discussions such as innovations and services offered by fintech start-
ups, whether fintech industry should be regulated and the way it should be regulated.6 The 
effects of Brexit on the financial market have been addressed from two different perspectives: 
effect on the UK and effects on the EU. However, the effects of Brexit on global financial 
stability have not been analysed in depth.7 In addition, the relationship between EME and the 
financial market are usually discussed by economists and are addressed from the perspective 
of ensuring domestic financial stability on EME markets.8 In contrast here we look at the effect 
of EME on global financial stability.  
 
Further when it comes to work on global financial stability, analysts and policy makers have 
mainly concentrated on addressing the causes of the 2008 crisis; particularly issues related to 
financial institutions and financial markets.9 They have not focussed on newer issues that could 
in the future represent a challenge to global financial stability. The three issues addressed here 
do not emerge from financial institutions and financial markets as such; but they nevertheless 
have the potential to destabilise global finance.  
 
This article argues that what links all three issues (Brexit, fintech and EME) is policy 
uncertainty: because policy makers are not currently addressing these matters from a global 
financial perspective there is a risk of gaps in legislation. These gaps can be exploited by 
(financial) institutions and lead to uncertainty for actors on the international financial market. 
This uncertainty leads to more volatile markets caused by sudden changes in capital flows 
which are the result of financial actors taking reactive ad hoc decisions.  
 
This article analyses the arguments as to why these three issues could form a potential threat 
to global financial stability and builds up the argument as to how these risks are currently 
 
6 See for example, Christopher Bradley, FinTech's Double Edges, Chi.-Kent L. Rev 61 (2018); Christopher Odinet, 
Consumer Bitcredit and Fintech Lending, 69 Ala. L. Rev.  781 (2018); Charles Mooney, Fintech and Secured 
Transactions Systems of the Future, 81 Law & Contemp. Probs. 1 (2018); and Chris Brummer and Yesha Yadav, 
Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 Geo. L.J. 235 (2019). 
7  See for example, Jeremy Cape, Brexit and Taxes, 47 Intertax 345 (2019); Christopher McCorkindale, Brexit 
and Human Rights, 22 Edinburgh L. Rev 126 (2018); and Giorgio Sacerdoti and Paulo Mariani, Brexit and Trade 
Issues’ 11 Eur. J. Legal Stud 187 (2019). 
8 See for example, Anne Krueger, The Rise of the Emerging Markets ,18 Law & Bus. Rev. Am 445 (2012); Claire 
Hill, Whole Business Securitization in Emerging Markets, 12 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 521 (2002); and Ayuli 
Jemide, More Appetite for Emerging Markets, 27 Int'l Fin. L. Rev.70 (2008). 
9 The G20, Supra n.2 
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underregulated. The article contributes to the literature first by analysing the nature of the 
stability risks to global finance emanating from Brexit, fintech and EME (e.g. ….). Second it 
contributes by examining the commonalities that emerge from these issues to better understand 
how these should be addressed. Whilst this article does not aim to provide the regulatory 
solutions that should be implemented it makes a key contribution by identifying these 
commonalities. The below paragraphs briefly explain why these three issues specifically 
represent a risk to global financial stability.  
 
Financial technology or fintech indicate technological innovations that influence financial 
services. Fintech industry has the potential to make substantial changes to the current structure 
of the financial system and this might have implications for financial stability. The article 
argues that compared to the exponential growth of fintech, the policy measures are still 
insufficient. This article investigates the potential risks that fintech could pose to financial 
stability such as the growth of fintech businesses that offer financial services but fall outside 
the regulatory boundary, cyber risk and the rise of third-party reliance within the financial 
system that could cause systemic risk.  
 
Another potential regulatory challenge to financial stability is Brexit. More than three years 
after the 2016 Referendum it is still not clear what shape the legal relationship of the UK and 
the EU will be in the future. Given the importance of the UK financial sector on both a 
European and a global scale, any disruption of the sector could threaten international financial 
stability. This is because of the imbalance between the financial market in the UK and the other 
Member States which make it particularly vulnerable to significant changes in the legal 
framework as well as the policy gaps that are likely to emerge following a hastily negotiated 
treaty, for instance the loss of passporting rights which will see UK financial institutions treated 
as third state institutions. This is especially aggravated by the lack of planning and the threat 
of a chaotic Brexit (which is a risk if the EU and the UK cannot agree on future relations during 
the transition period.) 
 
Finally, because EME play a more significant role in the global economy due to their growth, 
threats to financial stability now flow from EME to advanced economies and that could 
threaten global financial stability. In 2008 the role of EME in the financial market was smaller 
and therefore they were greatly affected by the financial crisis but the influence of those effects 
on the global financial market was less significant. Now that EME play a more important role 
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any major disturbance to their domestic markets are much more likely to affect the international 
financial market. Such disturbances are more frequent in EME because their domestic policy 
is often (perceived to be) less stable which creates uncertainty for financial actors, and this 
leads to a more volatile market. 
 
The analysis of these three issues leads to an understanding of the underlying commonalities. 
First, these issues are currently not addressed from a global financial stability perspective 
which leads to legislative gaps. Secondly, in particularly Brexit and EME are subject to a 
politicised process which means that either issues are not addressed, or they are used as political 
leverage. This then leads to policy uncertainty which leads to a more unpredictable response 
from the financial market which causes volatility in capital flows and this in turns affects global 
financial stability.  
 
The remainder of the article is divided into five parts. First, because this article considers the 
potential threat of the three emerging regulatory challenges to financial stability, Part 2 lays 
out the background to the subject and examines the concept of financial stability and the shift 
from micro-prudential regulations to macro-prudential. It also explains regulatory responses to 
achieve global financial stability post-the GFC. The purpose of this part is to ensure an 
understanding of the current international financial market in order to understand why these 
new regulatory challenges have emerged and why so far these have not been sufficiently 
acknowledged and addressed in financial regulations. Part 3 discuss the risks that fintech could 
pose to financial stability, highlighting the regulatory approaches that have been so far emerged 
as a response to the development of fintech. Part 4 analyses the factors related to Brexit that 
threaten financial stability, investigating the short-term issues such as the loss of passporting 
rights and the long-term consequences coming from diverging regulations which are enhanced 
by the significant role that the UK plays on the global financial market. Part 5 explores the key 
issues in EMEs that could threaten global financial stability, focusing on abrupt changes in 
trade policy which is often used as a political tool which leads to volatility on the financial 
market due to sudden changes in capital flows. Part 6 concludes by summarising key points 
and identifying the commonalities between these threats.  
 
2. Financial Stability and Macro-Prudential Regulation 
In order to understand the potential impact of the three new regulatory challenges on financial 
stability, this section discusses the concept of financial stability and its importance post the 
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GFC. It also sheds light on the failure of micro-prudential rules and the move to macro-
prudential policy to achieve the financial stability objective before examining the key 
regulatory responses to achieve global financial stability post the GFC, which are based on 
macro-prudential approach.      
 
Over a decade has passed since the beginnings of the GFC that resulted in the most severe 
financial panic in the global financial markets since the Great Depression. It is recognised that 
financial crises can have devastating effects on the broader economy.10 The failure of large 
financial institutions and the crash of financial markets can cause problems in accessing credit, 
leading to an intense recession. The root causes of the 2008 GFC were summarized by G20 as 
follows: 
During a period of strong global growth, growing capital flows, and 
prolonged stability earlier this decade, market participants sought higher 
yields without an adequate appreciation of the risks and failed to exercise 
proper due diligence. At the same time, weak underwriting standards, 
unsound risk management practices, increasingly complex and opaque 
financial products, and consequent excessive leverage combined to create 
vulnerabilities in the system. Policy makers, regulators and supervisors, in 
some advanced countries, did not adequately appreciate and address the 
risks building up in financial markets, keep pace with financial innovation, 




Major failures in the financial regulation and supervision were fundamental causes of the crisis. 
Particularly, the GFC showed many deficiencies in the pre-crisis approach to financial stability 
regulation.12 The economic and social costs of the crisis showed that the theory of the self-
correcting nature of capital markets is not anymore adequate.13 To illustrate, in the self-
 
10 See, Robert W. Kolb, Lessons from the Financial Crisis: Causes, Consequences, and Our Economic Future, 135 
(New Jersey; John Wiley & Sons, 2010).  
11 The G20, G20 Special Leaders Summit on the Financial Situation  Washington DC (2008). Available at 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/summits/2008washington.html accessed 16 June 2019. 
12  Hilary Allen, A New Philosophy for Financial Stability Regulation 45 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 174-230 (2013).  
13  Jeffrey Friedman & Wladimir Kraus, Engineering the Financial Crisis: Systemic Risk and the Failure of 
Regulation, 119 (Pennsylvania; University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011). 
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correction process, the market price either rises or decreases in response to a deficiency or an 
excess to restore the balance between quantity demanded and quantity supplied.14 This process 
works automatically to adjust from disequilibrium to equilibrium without the need for 
government intervention to regulate the market. This process assumes that market actors are 
rational, and they act efficiently for the most part. However, the collapse of the financial system 
in 2008 demonstrated that this assumption is false. As a result, the enhancement of financial 
regulation was placed as a core position to strengthen financial system and regulatory regimes 
and to avoid future crises. remarkably, since the GFC, the goal of financial stability has become 
the dominant idea of any financial reform nationally or internationally.15 Further, since the 
stability of the financial system has become a pre-condition to any reform after the GFC, it is 
essential to define financial stability. In spite of the increased focus on the importance of 
financial stability issues, there is, as yet, no generally accepted agreement on what financial 
stability precisely means. Reviewing the financial stability literature, two schools of thought 
are manifestly discernible. While the first school focusses on defining financial instability, the 
second school's representatives attempt to define financial stability. 
 
In the first school of thought, Chant, for example, characterised financial instability as 
‘…conditions in financial markets that harm or threaten to harm an economy’s performance 
through their impact on the working of the financial system’.16 The definition proposes that 
financial instability should be evaluated with regard to the potential impact of changes in 
financial conditions on the real economy. Further, Mishkin suggested that ‘financial instability 
occurs when shocks to the financial system interfere with information flow so that the financial 
system can no longer do its job of channeling funds to those with productive investment 
opportunities’.17 The definition affirms the substantial role of information failures in causing 
financial instability.  
 
 
14 Ismael Hossein-zadeh, Beyond Mainstream Explanations of the Financial Crisis: Parasitic Finance Capital, 12 
(New York; Routledge, 2014). 
15 Niamh Moloney, The legacy Effects of the Financial Crisis on Regulatory design in the EU' in The Regulatory 
Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, 118 (New York; Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
16  Bank of Canada, Essays on Financial Stability, Technical Report No. 95 (2003) available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.172.8150&rep=rep1&type=pdf accessed 16 June 
2019. 
17  Frederic S. Mishkin, Global Financial Instability: Framework, Events, Issues 13 Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 3-20 (1999). 
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In the second school of thought, Schinasi defined financial stability as ‘A financial system is in 
a range of stability whenever it is capable of facilitating (rather than impeding) the 
performance of an economy and of dissipating financial imbalances that arise endogenously 
or as a result of significant adverse and unanticipated events’.18 While the definition does not 
view financial stability as a single or static condition, it stresses that financial stability is a 
continuum. Further, Crockett stated that financial stability requires ‘that the key institutions in 
the financial system are stable, in that there is a high degree of confidence that they continue 
to meet their contractual obligations without interruption or outside assistance; and that the 
key markets are stable...’.19 The definition focuses only two components of the financial 
system: financial institutions and markets. However, it does not include the third main element 
of the financial system which is financial infrastructure.  
 
In 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) defined financial stability as: 
A condition in which the financial system—comprising of financial 
intermediaries, markets and market infrastructures—is capable of 
withstanding shocks and the unraveling of financial imbalances, 
thereby mitigating the likelihood of disruptions in the financial 
intermediation process which are severe enough to significantly 
impair the allocation of savings to profitable investment 
opportunities.20 
The significance of the ECB definition comes from the fact that it considers financial stability 
as a broad concept, encompassing the three core components of the financial system: financial 
institutions, markets and infrastructure. Considering the close interlinkages between all of these 
components, expectations of disruptions in any of the individual elements can impact the 
overall stability. To illustrate, disruptions may initially arise and develop in a single institution 
and subsequently spread to other elements of the financial system. Therefore, the regulatory 
intervention to attain financial stability should be comprehensive, addressing the three key 
components. Leaving any gap in these elements will result in the instability of the financial 
system. This approach is called the macro-prudential approach. In the aftermath of the GFC, 
 
18 Garry J. Schinasi, Defining Financial Stability IMF Working Paper No. WP/04/187, (2004) available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04187.pdf accessed 16 June 2019. 
19  Andrew D. Crockett, Why is Financial Stability a Goal of Public Policy? 6 Economic Review 5-22 (1997).  





there seems to be a consensus among regulators and academics that financial regulation needs 
to follow the macro-prudential approach. 
 
Prior to the GFC, the presumption that the resilience of individual financial institutions is both 
an essential and adequate condition to guarantee the resilience of the whole financial system 
was incorrect because events during the GFC have demonstrated that the resilience of 
individual institutions is insufficient to avoid instability in the financial system.21 Micro-
prudential rules failed to consider the influence of individual financial institutions' risk-taking 
on the broader financial system and economy, and how the interconnectedness of financial 
institutions could largely spread systemic risks across the financial system.22 For instance, in 
times when risk is recognised to be high, selling an asset might be seen as a prudent response 
by an individual financial institution. But if many financial institutions apply this approach, 
there will be collapse in asset prices, which in turn could lead to huge volatility in asset markets. 
Therefore, to achieve the financial stability objective, it was necessary to focus on the resilience 
and robustness of the financial system as a whole. This holistic approach adopted by many 
financial regulators is called macro-prudential policy. The European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB) states that ‘the ultimate objective of the macro-prudential policy is to contribute to the 
safeguard of the stability of the financial system as a whole, including by strengthening the 
resilience of the financial system and decreasing the build-up of systemic risks, thereby 
ensuring the sustainable contribution of the financial sector to economic growth’.23 It is 
significant to mention that macro-prudential policy has become one of the main features of the 
post-crisis international financial regulatory reform agenda.  
 
Further, macro-prudential policy uses a range of tools to achieve its ultimate objective because 
applying a single tool is unlikely to be sufficient to address the different sources of systemic 
risk.24 This can include mandatory capital buffers, liquidity fees, suspension of redemption and 
 
21 See, Rainer Masera, CRR/CRD IV: The Trees and the Forest, 67 PSL Quarterly Review 381-422(2014).  
22 See, Andreas Krause, Systemic Risk, in Investment Risk Management, 189 (New York; Oxford University 
Press, 2015). 
23  European Systemic Risk Board, Recommendation of The European Systemic Risk Board of 4 April 2013 On 
Intermediate Objectives And Instruments of Macro-Prudential Policy (ESRB/2013/1), C 170/1. (2013)  Available 
at https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/recommendations/2013/ESRB_2013_1.en.pdf accessed 16 June 
2019.  
24 Systemic risk is defined by the OECD as “the risk that the inability of one institution to meet its obligations 
when due will cause other institutions to be unable to meet their obligations when due. Such a failure may cause 
significant liquidity or credit problems and, as a result, could threaten the stability of or confidence in markets”. 
OECD, Glossary Of Statistical Terms (2004) available at https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6796  
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stress tests. Stress tests play an important role in assessing the vulnerability of the financial 
system to adverse shocks.25 Mandatory capital buffers are another important tool that macro-
prudential authorities can use to address specific vulnerabilities. These require financial 
institutions, in addition to minimum capital requirements, to maintain higher capital to asset 
ratios to ensure that they continue to operate in the event of adverse shocks in the financial 
markets without the need to shrink assets.26 
2.1 Regulatory Responses to Achieve Global Financial Stability Post-the Global Financial 
Crisis   
The GFC that began in the US had a direct spill over to the rest of the world financial markets. 
Immediately in the aftermath of the GFC, political leaders recognised that there were critical 
deficiencies in the way financial markets and institutions had been regulated.27 In response, in 
April 2009 in London, the G20 announced a comprehensive global reform agenda to tackle the 
causes of the crisis.28 The G20 agenda was initially agreed in the 2008 G20 Washington Action 
Plan and developed in subsequent key summits, including the April 2009 London Summit and 
the September 2009 Pittsburgh Summit. The reform Agenda aimed at establishing a more 
robust and resilient global financial system that can promote the real economy in times of stress 
and diminishing the chance and costs of future financial crises in the most effective way. 
Further, to achieve financial stability and implement its agenda, the G20, in April 2009, 
established the Financial Stability Board (FSB) as the successor to the Financial Stability 
Forum (FSF). The FSB was delegated a variety of tasks including: (1) monitoring and advising 
on market developments and their implications for regulatory policy; (2) promoting 
information-sharing among supervisors; (3) supporting contingency planning for cross-border 
crisis management; (4) identifying and assessing the problems in the global financial system; 
and (5) collaborating with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to conduct Early Warning 
Exercises.29 
 
In addition, the G20 reform programme, coordinated by the FSB, is built on the four pillars of: 
making financial institutions more resilient; ending the problem of financial institutions being 
 
25 Damodaran Krishnamurti & Yejin Carol Lee, Macroprudential Policy Framework: A Practice Guide, 50 
(Washington; World Bank Publications, 2014).  
26 See, Matthias Haentjens & Pierre Gioia-Carabellese, European Banking and Financial Law, 102 (New York; 
Routledge, 2015). 
27  The G20, Supra n.2 
28  The G20, Supra n.2 
29 FSB tasks available at https://www.fsb.org/about/  
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too-big-to-fail; making over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets safer; and transforming 
shadow banking into resilient market‑based finance. A complete discussion and analysis of 
these pillars is beyond the scope of this article, but brief discussion of the key elements is 
necessary to assess whether the global financial system is stable.  
 
A. Making financial institutions more resilient 
One of the core elements of the post- crisis reform was making financial institutions more 
resilient, with higher capital and liquidity requirements and more efficient supervision. 
Therefore, the central banking and supervisory community, coordinated with the FSB, 
recognised that reforming banking regulation was essential. At the heart of this pillar is the 
Basel III initiative to boost the existing regulatory framework for internationally active banks, 
by increasing the quantity and quality of bank capital.30 The crisis demonstrated that previously 
permitted capital levels were inadequate given the maturity transformational nature of 
banking.31 In December 2010, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) released 
Basel III. In December 2017, BCBS finalized Basel III, after agreeing on rules that restrict the 
potential for unwarranted variability of internal model-based risk weights across countries so 
the capital ratios might be applied more equally across jurisdictions. For instance, Basel III 
also introduced two elements of liquidity regulation: the liquidity coverage ratio and the net 
stable funding ratio.32 While the liquidity coverage ratio aims at promoting the short-term 
resilience of the liquidity risk profile of banks, the main aim of the net stable funding ratio is 
to reduce funding risk over a longer time.33 Another important initiative to make financial 
institutions more resilient is the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) lead 
to develop a global risk-based Insurance Capital Standard (ICS) for internationally active 
insurance groups and strengthening supervisory effectiveness, through its ComFrame project.34  
 
B. Ending too-big-to-fail 
 
30 FSB, Supra n.4.  
31 The term maturity transformation refers to the difference in the residual contractual maturity between 
assets and liabilities. 
32 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Liquidity Risk 
Monitoring Tools (2013). Available at www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.htm accessed 16 June 2019.  
33 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Progress Report on Implementation of the Basel Regulatory 
Framework (2013). Available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs247.pdf accessed 16 June 2019.  
34  See, Georges Ugeux, International Finance Regulation: The Quest for Financial Stability, 65 (New Jersey; 
John Wiley & Sons, 2014).  
12 
 
The phrase “too big to fail” indicates the threat to the real economy of a tragic failure of a 
financial institution. The GFC showed that national authorities were not able to deal with the 
failures of large cross-border financial institutions safely and without recourse to public funds.  
For instance, the failure of Lehman Brothers was bailed out using public funds.35 As a result, 
in 2011, the G20 endorsed a set of policy rules to address the risks to the global financial system 
from systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), with a specific focus on global SIFIs 
(G-SIFIs)36 to manifest the greater risks that these institutions pose to the global financial 
system.37 In November 2018 the FSB published an updated list of global systemically 
important banks (G-SIBs) using an assessment methodology designed by BCBS.38 
 
C. Making derivatives markets safer 
The OTC derivatives markets is one of the most internationally active markets, allowing the 
transmission of risks across markets, institutions, and cross-borders. Prior to the GFC, 
deficiencies in OTC derivatives markets contributed to the increase in systemic risk and the 
damage caused by the crisis.39 As a consequence, improvements to OTC derivatives markets 
are a key pillar of the G20 reform agenda. These improvements aim at mitigating systemic risk, 
reducing market abuse and increasing transparency. The reforms, for example, include trade 
reporting, exchange or platform trading of standardised contracts, central clearing of all 
standardised OTC derivatives contracts, and margining standards and higher capital 
requirements for non-centrally cleared contracts. The majority of FSB jurisdictions- which 
cover more than 90% of OTC derivative transactions- now have in force frameworks for 
determining when standardised OTC derivatives should be centrally cleared.40 
 
D. Transforming shadow banking into resilient market-based finance 
 
35  See, Eric. Posner, Last Resort: The Financial Crisis and the Future of Bailouts, 35 (Chicago; University of 
Chicago Press, 2018). 
36 A systemically important financial institution or systemically important bank is a bank, insurance company, 
or other financial institution whose failure might trigger a financial crisis.  
37 See, FSB, Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs), (2019). Available at 
https://www.fsb.org/work-of-the-fsb/policy-development/addressing-sifis/global-systemically-important-
financial-institutions-g-sifis/ accessed 16 June 2019.   
38 FSB, 2017 list of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), (2018). Available at 
https://www.fsb.org/2018/11/2018-list-of-global-systemically-important-banks-g-sibs/ accessed 16 June 2019.  
39  FSB, Supra n.4 
40 See, FSB, OTC Derivatives Market Reforms: Twelfth Progress Report on Implementation, (2017). Available at 
https://www.fsb.org/2017/06/otc-derivatives-market-reforms-twelfth-progress-report-on-implementation/ 
accessed 16 June 2019.  
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The GFC revealed many systemic problems arising from so called shadow banking activities. 
In 2012, the FSB defined shadow banking as “credit intermediation involving entities and 
activities (fully or partially) outside the regular banking system".41 Unlike traditional banks, 
shadow banks are outside the scope of traditional banking regulation. The shock caused by the 
exploding of the housing bubble and sub-prime mortgage crisis caused a run on the shadow 
banking system. However, shadow banks did not have the traditional deposit insurance to 
protect them from this run.42 In 2011, the FSB announced a comprehensive framework – the 
Shadow Banking Roadmap – to strengthen regulation and oversight of shadow banking, 
including strengthening money market funds, improving securities financing markets, reducing 
interconnectedness between banking and nonbank sectors and improving securitization 
markets. The most significant achievement in the area of shadow banking is the new set of 
rules governing money market funds (MMFs). In the US, on July 23, 2014, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted a substantial reform to the regulatory framework 
governing MMFs.43 The reform came into force on October 2016. The main components of the 
reform are the introduction of the floating net assets value (FNAV), and the liquidity fees and 
redemption gates. In the EU, the new European MMFs regulation was published in the EU 
Official Journal on 30 June 2017 and came into force on 21 July 2017.44 The EU reform follows 
the US reform in adoption of liquidity fees and redemption gate; however, the distinctive 
attribute of this reform is the introduction of Low Volatility NAV (LVNAV) MMFs. Further, 
In January 2017 the FSB finalised its recommendations to address structural vulnerabilities and 
reduce liquidity mismatches associated with asset management.45 
 
Remarks on the post-crisis reforms 
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the post GFC reforms have made significant 
progress. They have principally addressed the fault lines that caused the crisis. Banks are 
considerably better capitalised, more liquid and less leveraged. Reforms to the OTC derivatives 
 
41  See, FSB, Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking, (2013). Available at 
https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_130829b.pdf accessed 16 June 2019.  
42  See, IMF, Shadow Banking and Market Based Finance (2017). Available at 
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2017/09/13/sp091417-shadow-banking-and-market-based-finance 
accessed 25 April 2020.  
43 See, SEC, SEC Adopts Money Market Fund Reform Rules (2014) available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2014-143  
44  See, Regulation (EU) 2017/1131 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on money 
market funds [2017] OJ L 169/8.  
45  Available at https://www.fsb.org/2017/01/policy-recommendations-to-address-structural-vulnerabilities-
from-asset-management-activities/ accessed 16 June 2019.  
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markets have created a more transparent and robust system, and implementation of too-big-to-
fail (TBTF) reforms is advancing. The elements of shadow banking that contributed to the 
financial crisis have declined significantly. In general, the financial system is more resilient 
and diversified. However, it is significant to highlight two key points. First, while the benefits 
from the post-crisis banking regulatory framework are obvious, extensive regulations have had 
a key impact on the shrinkage of bank's profitability. Since the global financial crisis, bank 
profitability has declined across countries.46 At least partially, this reflects lower leverage 
created by the regulatory reforms. Further, International bank lending has dropped since the 
crisis and its business structure has shifted from cross-border towards more stable regionally-
funded lending.47 Secondly, the post GFC framework focuses on established business models 
that caused the GFC whether in conventional or shadow banking and was, therefore, 
unprepared for disruption by explosion in the application of different technologies in financial 
services by both regulated and unregulated fintech businesses offering niche financial products.  
 
3. Fintech and Financial Stability 
This section examines the exponential growth of fintech and the potential benefits of fintech 
for the financial system. However, it then goes on to provide original analysis as to specific 
risks posed by fintech that might threaten the global financial stability: namely unregulated 
fintech businesses, cyber risk and the rise of third-party reliance within the financial system 
that could cause systemic risk. It also discusses the regulatory responses to fintech and how 
these responses are still insufficient given the rapid growth of the fintech sector.      
 
What is Fintech? 
Financial technology or fintech refers to technological innovations that affect financial 
services. The term "fintech" has become widely used within the past few years. The potential 
of reducing costs, increasing efficiency, improving access to financial services makes fintech 
so attractive.48 There is no industry-wide consensus about the definition of fintech. 
Nonetheless, the FSB's definition for fintech is very useful in light of the development of the 
fintech industry. The FSB defines fintech as ‘technologically enabled financial innovation that 
could result in new business models, applications, processes, or products with an associated 
 
46 Bank for International Settlements, Structural changes in banking after the crisis, (2018) CGFS Papers No 60 
available at https://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs60.htm accessed 24 February 2020.   
47 Bank for International Settlements, Supra n.46.     
48 See, Pranay Gupta & T. Mandy Tham, Fintech: The New DNA of Financial Services, 39 (Berlin; Walter de 
Gruyter GmbH & Co KG, 2018).  
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material effect on financial markets and institutions and the provision of financial services’.49 
Further, the fintech industry encompasses a variety of tech-fuelled innovations. Many of these 
innovations tend to be start-ups that usually focus on applying a specific technology to promote 
or transform a particular process or financial service. Examples include smart contracts, robo-
advice, distributed ledger technology, big data applications and peer-to-peer (P2P) lending. 
Generally, the fintech sector can be categorized into five broad areas: (1) payments; (2) 
financing (lending/crowdfunding); (3) asset management services; (4) insurance; and (5) other 
fintechs such as security, and data and analytics.50 Robo-advisors, for example, are automated 
interfaces that provide investment advice and investment management services without any 
human intervention by using algorithms and asset allocation models which are advertised as 
being tailored to each individual’s investment needs.51 Because human intervention is 
eliminated, robo-advisors services are substantially cheaper than those of traditional 
management companies.  
 
Fintech has grown rapidly in recent years. A KPMG report shows that, in 2018, global venture 
investment in fintech companies reached $111.8 billion across 2,196 deals, up from $50.80 
billion in 2017 and $ 25 billion in 2016.52 This rapid growth is driven by different factors such 
as technological advances, higher customer expectations for cost, convenience and speed, and 
the substantial changes in the financial regulations post the GFC.53 This exponential growth 
raises an important question about the impact of fintech on financial stability. It might be 
argued that fintech sector is still too small relative to the overall financial system to present a 
compelling risk to financial stability. However, the industry's fast-paced development means 
that financial regulators should consider this sector in their financial stability risk assessment 
to guard against future risks. In order to identify the potential implications of fintech for 
financial stability, it is necessary to assess fintech’s potential benefits and risks. Fintech holds 
great promise for the financial system because it has the potential to transform the financial 
system across a great variety of products and services. This variety in the financial services can 
 
49  See, FSB, Financial Stability Implications from FinTech, Supervisory and Regulatory Issues that Merit 
Authorities’ Attention (2017) available at https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/R270617.pdf  
50 FSB, Supra n.49.  
51  Ihy Chiu, Fintech and Disruptive Business Models in Financial Products, Intermediation, and Market-Policy 
Implications for Financial Regulators, 21 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 55-112 (2016). 
52 KPMG, The Pulse of Fintech 2018 (2018). Available at 
https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2019/02/the-pulse-of-fintech-2018.pdf accessed 26 June 
2019.  
53  See, Gregor Dorfleitner, Lars Hornuf, Matthias Schmitt & Martina Weber, FinTech in Germany, 1 (Berlin; 
Springer, 2017).  
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create a more efficient and resilient financial system. Applying productivity enhancing 
technologies, such as robo-advice, could enhance business models of incumbent financial 
institutions.54 Adoption of machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) could also promote 
improvements in decision-making processes, by enhancing the models that financial 
institutions and investors use. Fintech has also the potential to support growth by enabling more 
individuals to access financial services. For instance, robo-advisory services have the potential 
to increase access to wealth management for households who could not obtain similar 
traditional asset management services due to different reasons such as high fees paid to 
professional management.55  
 
 At the same time, it is undeniable that the development of fintech outside the boundaries of 
the supervisory and regulatory framework can pose risks to financial stability. Fintech 
businesses that offer financial services but fall outside the regulatory boundary or are subject 
to minimum regulatory standards may not be subject to the same level of monitoring of their 
governance to which regulated financial institutions are subject.56 The growth of these 
businesses could become a risk to the financial system. Fintech businesses could develop risky 
investment practices to generate more profits and if these practices are not subject to risk 
management regulations, they might pose serious risk to financial stability. 
 
Another important risk that fintech can pose to financial stability is cyber risk. When the 
systems of different institutions are connected to each other and there is a weak link, the 
vulnerability of financial activities to cyber-attacks is likely to be higher.57 Reliance of fintech 
firms on technology could also increase numbers and the range of entry points into the financial 
system, which hackers could attack. The case of Dwolla in the US is a clear example of the 
cyber risk. Dwolla is a fintech start up that offered payment and money transfer solutions. 
Dwolla confirmed to its customers that their personal data will be safe and secure. Nonetheless, 
because its cybersecurity system was outdated, the firm faced a cyberattack that put their 
customers’ data privacy in danger. Therefore, the US Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB) undertook a “data security enforcement action” against Dwolla, which then led to 
 
54 For further information about robo-advice see, Paolo Sironi, FinTech Innovation: From Robo-Advisors to Goal 
Based Investing and Gamification, 51 (Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, 2016). 
55 Sironi, Supra n.45, 50. 
56  FSB, Supra n.49.  
57 See, Douglas Arner, Janos Nathan Barberis & Ross Buckey, FinTech, RegTech, and the Reconceptualization of 
Financial Regulation 37 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 371-414 (2017). 
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Dwolla being fined with $100 thousand.58 It is significant to know that from 2013 to 2018 
cyber-attacks on Fintech firms resulted in at least $1,450 Million in losses due to fraud.59 While 
most jurisdictions address cyber -resilience through the lens of IT and general operational risk, 
there is typically a lack of explicit references to cybersecurity risk. A survey by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) shows that although awareness of cybersecurity risks is 
generally high and most countries have frameworks in place to protect the resilience of the 
financial system, gaps in mapping cyber risks are common, particularly among emerging 
markets and developing economies (EMDE).60 Further, another survey conducted by the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) on supervisory practices around cybersecurity in the EU 
financial sector demonstrates that there are many differences in the process of testing of 
regulated entities’ vulnerability and resilience to cyber risk and the cross-border cooperation 
with regards to such testing.61  
 
Further, some activities offered by fintech firms could increase third-party reliance within the 
financial system. Third-party service providers to financial institutions are rapidly becoming 
more important and vital, especially in the areas of cloud computing and data services. Cloud 
computing services, for example, could be provided by a small number of parties. Robo-advice, 
for instance, may rely on a set of third-party data providers that might be extremely 
concentrated.62 Disruptions to these third-party services, maybe due to operational issues, are 
more likely to pose systemic risks, which in turn could destabilise the financial system. To 
illustrate, systemic risk is best characterized by connectedness. When financial institutions 
become more connected, the systemic risk increases. The more points of connectedness 
between financial institutions there are, the more points of vulnerability to the financial system. 
 
58 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Administrative Proceeding, (2016). Available at 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201603_cfpb_consent-order-dwolla-inc.pdf.  
59 IMF Working Paper, Cyber Risk for the Financial Sector: A Framework for Quantitative Assessment, (2018) 
available at https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2018/06/22/Cyber-Risk-for-the-Financial-Sector-
A-Framework-for-Quantitative-Assessment-45924 accessed 25 April 2020.  
60 International Monetary Fund and World Bank Group, Fintech: The Experience So Far, (2019) available at 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2019/06/27/Fintech-The-Experience-So-Far-47056 
accessed 25 February 2020.  
61 The European Supervisory Authorities, Joint Advice on the Costs and Benefits of a Coherent Cyber Resilience 
Testing Framework for Significant Market Participants and Infrastructures, (2019) available at 
https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/documents/10180/2551996/d229589f-a855-45f2-ad5a-
411792792e60/JC%202019%2025%20(Joint%20ESAs%20Advice%20on%20a%20coherent%20cyber%20resilien
ce%20testing%20framework).pdf accessed 26 February 2020.  




Therefore, the failure of a cloud provider could be disastrous to the financial system and the 
economy.   
 
The foregoing discussion about the benefits and risks of fintech raises a question about how 
fintech industry should be regulated to mitigate the financial stability risks. In order to answer 
this question, it is important to discuss how fintech fits within existing regulatory frameworks. 
As discussed earlier, the financial regulatory reforms enacted since the GFC has focused on 
traditional financial institutions. Particularly, they have been premised on addressing the roots 
of the crisis caused by the traditional financial institutions. Taking into consideration the fact 
that majority of the fintech firms are not regarded as traditional financial institutions, the 
reforms have failed to consider the rise of fintech and its potential to alter financial service 
attributes and market structure. This implies that, generally, the current regulatory frameworks 
concerning financial institutions’ operations and activities do not apply to all fintech firms’ 
activities and that may exert a negative effect on the stability of the entire financial system.  
 
For instance, a recent survey by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) shows 
that the main area where regulatory gaps and issues have been identified by National 
Competent Authorities (NCAs) and where fintech firms do not fit neatly within the existing 
rules is related to crypto-assets, Initial Coin Offering (ICOs)63 and Distributed Ledger 
Technology (DLTs).64 In these areas, many NCAs have asked for clarification of EU regulatory 
requirements. NCAs, for instance, claim that there is a lack of clarity in relation to the definition 
of financial instruments and the legal nature of crypto assets. 
 
Another important survey by IMF and World Bank Group (WBG) reviewing fintech 
developments across the membership finds that nearly two-thirds of the countries responding 
to the survey identified gaps in which fintech issues are not adequately addressed by their 
current legal frameworks, especially the legal framework for financial sector related to peer-
to- peer lending, crypto-assets, robo-advisory services, mobile money, algorithmic trading, and 
lending activities using AI.65  
 
63 An Initial Coin Offering is a method of raising funds using cryptocurrencies. It is often a form of 
crowdfunding  
64 The European Securities and Markets Authority, Report on the Licensing of FinTech Business Models, (2019) 
available at https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma50-164-
2430_licensing_of_fintech.pdf accessed 25 February 2020.  
65 International Monetary Fund and World Bank Group, Supra n.60.  
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It is also significant to emphasise that traditional regulatory frameworks and regulatory 
institutions might be too slow and inflexible to properly regulate fintech. A careful balance, 
therefore, needs to be struck between enabling fintech and addressing challenges to financial 
stability. This balance is necessary not only to preserve financial stability but also to avoid 
stalling the development of fintech. 
 
Three regulatory approaches have so far emerged as a response to the development of fintech. 
The first approach is “wait and see” or doing nothing and this approach could be characterised 
as a laissez-faire approach.66 While adopting this lenient regulatory approach may be beneficial 
for the development of fintech, it entails different risks. Since reforming financial regulations 
after the GFC, traditional financial institutions work under strict regulatory requirements and a 
‘wait and see approach’ for fintech would give fintech firms an unfair competitive advantage. 
This regulatory approach may also drive financial intermediation into a sector where financial 
regulators only have limited influence. The second regulatory approach is a formal approach, 
where financial regulators reform the existing regulations or enact new regulations in order to 
provide a more proper and effective framework for new fintech firms and new activities.67 For 
instance, Mexico enacted Fintech Law in 2018 to promote financial inclusivity and 
technological innovation. In the EU, the Payment Services Directive (PSD2), which entered 
into application on 13 January 2018, facilitates innovative financial technology companies, 
competition and efficiency. The PSD2 sets the rules on what type of organisations can provide 
payment services within the European Economic Area (EEA).68 
 
The third approach is the experimentalist approach, which involves introducing innovation 
facilitators such as accelerators, innovation hubs and regulatory sandboxes.69 Accelerators aim 
at supporting particular tasks of policy relevance with funding support.70 An innovation hub is 
a platform established by the regulatory authority where the developers of fintech start-ups 
 
66 See, Douglas Arner, Janos Nathan Barberis, Dirk A. Zetzsche & Ross Buckey, FinTech and RegTech: Enabling 
Innovation While Preserving Financial Stability, 18 Geo. J. Int'l Aff. 47-58 (2017). 
67 See, European Securities and Markets Authority, Financial Technology: ESMA’s Approach, 4th Luxembourg 
FinTech Conference (2018). Available at https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma71-99-
1051_speech_on_cryptoassets_-_pa.pdf  accessed 8 July 2019.  
68 Available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32015L2366 accessed 8 July 
2019.  
69  See, FSB, Regulatory and Supervisory Issues from FinTech, (2017) available at https://www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/Cambridge-Centre-for-Alternative-Finance-Regulatory-and-Supervisory-Issues-from-
FinTech.pdf accessed 9 July 2019.  
70 Gupta and Tham Supra n.48, at 27. 
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receive guidance from the regulator and, sometimes, from each other. The main function of 
innovation hub is to promote innovations and to provide advice to newly established firms for 
a fixed period.71 In Australia, for example, an Innovation Hub was introduced in 2015, with 
the aim of making it easier for the creators of fintech innovations to understand the regulatory 
framework of financial intermediation.72 A sandbox creates a testing environment or safe place 
for fintech innovations to test products with less risk of being punished by the regulator. The 
main aim of sandbox is to remove unnecessary regulatory barriers to innovations by allowing 
them to test their financial product or business model for a predetermined period on real 
consumers.73 In the UK, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) first introduced the sandbox 
concept through an initiative called "Project Innovate". The Project Innovate aimed at allowing 
fintech firms to introduce their innovative services, products, and business models to the 
financial market, without subjecting them to the full set of regulatory restrictions imposed by 
the FCA.74 The FCA also minimized costs and administrative barriers to fintech firms and new 
entrants. In order to ensure the success of the project, the FCA established "sandbox unit" to 
deal with sandbox applications and supervise the testing process by the fintech companies. 
Inspired by the success of the FCA's sandbox in the UK, many other countries around the 
world, such as, Canada, Thailand, Australia, Malaysia, Bahrain, UAE, US, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore, have developed similar forms of a regulatory sandbox.75 
 
Further, while some jurisdictions have taken or plan to take policy measures on fintech, the 
scope and scale of changes or planned changes vary substantially. Generally, these measures 
are still insufficient given the rapid growth of the fintech sector and its potential threat to global 
financial stability and most of these measures do not take into account the fact that majority of 
the fintech companies are not regarded as traditional financial institutions. This can be 
attributed to the lack of the regulators knowledge about Fintech industry. It is also necessary 
to emphasise the fact that the majority of the countries adopt "do nothing" approach to the 
development of fintech either intentionally or otherwise.76 Even in the countries that have taken 
 
71 Magyar Nemzeti Bank, Innovation and Stability Overview of Fintech in Hungary, consultation document 
(2017) available at https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/consultation-document.pdf accessed 8 July 2019.    
72  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, ‘ASIC’s Innovation Hub and our approach to regulatory 
technology’ (2017) available at https://download.asic.gov.au/media/4270022/rep523-published-26-may-
2017.pdf accessed 8 July 2019.  
73 See, Christopher G. Bradley, FinTech's Double Edges, 93 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 61-95 (2018).   
74 For further information see, FCA, Regulatory sandbox, (2019) available at 
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/regulatory-sandbox accessed 8 July 2019.    
75Magyar Nemzeti Bank, Supra n. 71.      
76 European Securities and Markets Authority, Supra n.67. 
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important steps in regulating fintech, there are still some regulatory gaps that should be 
addressed. The EU, for example, has introduced two key regulations in the form of the General 
Data Privacy Regulation (GDPR) and PSD2, both of which came into force in 2018. While the 
GDPR aims at protecting individual privacy by regulating the processing and transfer of 
personal data, the PSD2 compels banks to give third-party providers access to customers’ bank 
accounts, if requested by the customer. This would foster competition and innovation in 
financial services. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, certain fintech services and products 
offered in the EU such as crypto- assets, ICOs and DLTs are still not regulated. 
 
Since the fintech growth presents a global challenge in financial regulation, a dynamic, 
proactive, and responsive regulatory response might be supported by close international 
cooperation. Because financial regulators in most of the countries do not currently necessarily 
have appropriately experience to develop effective and comprehensive regulation in the fintech 
sector, international cooperation led by international bodies- especially FSB- is crucial for the 
development of fintech regulation and ensuring the global financial stability. On June 27, 2017, 
the FSB published a report that examines the potential impacts of fintech on financial 
stability.77 The report concluded that given the small size of fintech sector, there were no 
compelling financial stability risks from emerging fintech innovations. On February 14, 2019, 
the FSB published another report about fintech developments and potential financial stability 
implications.78 Although the FSB's report demonstrates the same findings of the 2017 report, 
it suggests that fintech has the potential to change the current structure of the financial system 
and as a result it may have implications for financial stability. However, experience shows that 
risks can emerge quickly if left unchecked. The role of unregulated shadow banking sector 
during the GFC in amplifying the crisis is a clear evidence of how risks can evolve very quickly. 
Therefore, the FSB approach should be proactive rather than reactive to mitigate the potential 
risks that fintech could have on financial stability.     
 
Further, given the lack of precise data and information about fintech and the small size of the 
industry, financial stability has never been cited as an objective for recent regulatory measures 
or reforms around fintech. Other than the financial stability, which is the main perspective of 
analysing the implications of fintech in this article, relevant lenses for policymakers and 
 
77 See, FSB, Supra n.49. 
78 FSB, FinTech and market structure in financial services: Market developments and potential financial stability 
implications, (2019) available at https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P140219.pdf accessed 8 July 2019.    
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academics such as: (1) market integrity; (2) consumer and investor protection; (3) financial 
inclusion; and (4) competition are at the fore. However, it is important to emphasise that the 
article does not undermine the significance of these regulatory lenses, but rather it goes beyond 
these concerns to demonstrate the significance of the financial stability when considering the 
implications of the fintech industry. In fact, there might be overlaps and trade-offs between 
those regulatory lenses and financial stability concern. Therefore, a careful balance needs to be 
struck between financial stability and other policy concerns.  
 
In sum, as explained above, fintech innovations bear various features of systemic risk, and the 
level of such risk is more likely to increase as the size of the fintech activities grows, although 
there is no clear evidence of such an effect at present. The post GFC reform of the financial 
industry has focused on different sectors of the market and has largely ignored the unique risks 
and problems associated with fintech. As a consequence, financial regulators have neither the 
tools nor the expertise necessary to deal with fintech risks and challenges to financial stability. 
 
4.Brexit and Financial Stability 
 
This section analyses the potential effects of Brexit on global financial stability. Its main 
conclusion is that the continuing uncertainty is potentially disruptive for global financial 
stability as it does not leave institutions the time to properly prepare for changes in regulation. 
Furthermore, there is a risk that the UK will either leave with no treaty after the transition 
period or with a hastily agreed treaty that leaves significant issues to be decided in the future. 
This will lead to several challenges with regards to global financial stability, which are analysed 
in this section.  
 
This section discusses first the important position of the UK on the global financial market. It 
then analyses the loss of passporting rights which is an issue of immediate concern as this will 
immediately affect financial firms and limit their operations. The third issue this section 
analyses is the long-term effects of a diverging legislative framework between the UK and the 
EU. The fourth part looks at several auxiliary issues which are likely to have an impact such 
as financial firms moving to other Member States and the position of the UK as a clearing 
house for euros. The concluding part analyses the importance that the agreement on the 




Overall, it points to the political uncertainties that dominate Brexit and which could influence 
international financial stability due partly to sudden changes in capital flow in the short term 
and divergent regulations between the EU Member States and the UK in the long term. It is 
argued below that these issues are closely connected with the overarching issue of policy 
uncertainty which represents a risk for global financial stability. Global legal harmonisation 
can counter policy uncertainty as it would limit the effect that Brexit has on the international 
financial market. This is of course a long-term solution and in the short-term governments 
might need to implement domestic legislation to counter the effects of Brexit on domestic 
financial stability. 
 
4.1 The Key Position of the UK Financial Sector 
The UK financial sector is one of the most internationally intertwined and globally competitive. 
It represents nearly one fifth of the global banking sector.79 The banking sector is the most 
Europeanised and internationalised of the EU Member States 80 and it is the largest financial 
sector in the EU81 and the largest financial exporter in the world.82 Assets held by the banking 
sector were nearly 450% of UK GDP in 2013.83 The sector is heavily international with about 
half of those assets held by foreign banks.84 Half of the assets of the banking sector consist of 
loans to non-banks which highlights the important role the UK banking sector plays in 
intermediating global capital.85 EU banks have concentrated most of their wholesale activities 
in the UK.86The financial sector in the UK is thus significant on both a European and a global 
scale and any disruption  to the sector threatens international financial stability. Furthermore, 
the overrepresentation of the financial sector in the UK economy in comparison to the rest of 
the EU means that in the other EU Member States the financial sector is underrepresented 
compared to the size of the economy. This has caused a reliance in these states on larger banks 
for investments and this makes their financial stability more dependent upon a smaller number 
 
79 Jakob Miethe & David Pothier, Brexit: What's at Stake for the Financial Sector? 6 DIW Economic Bulletin, 
364,364 (2016). 
80 David Howarth & Lucia Quaglia, Brexit and the Single European Financial Market, 55 J. Common Mark. Stud. 
149, 155 n.1 (2017). 
81 Howarth,Supra n.80 at 152. 
82 David Howarth & Lucia Quaglia Brexit and the battle for financial services, 25 J. Eur. Public Policy, 1118, 1118 
n.8 (2018) 
83 Miethe,Supra n.79, at 364. 
84 Miethe,Supra n.79, at 367. 
85 Miethe,Supra n.79, at 369. 





of large financial institutions.87 Thus financial risks are concentrated in a limited number of 
players which makes the market more vulnerable should there be any (potential) bankruptcy of 
one of these institutions.  
 
The above means that Brexit is likely to disrupt the financial stability in both the UK and the 
other EU Member States, which in turn could pose a threat to global financial stability. This is 
especially aggravated by the lack of clarity. Over three years after the referendum a transition 
deal was concluded for one year, ending on the 1st of January 2021. There currently is no deal 
for beyond that date and negotiations are ongoing. Serious doubts have been raised on whether 
is possible to conclude a trade agreement in this period.88 The  European Commission President 
has warned that one year will not be enough to conclude an agreement on every area and any 
special arrangements for the financial sector will have to wait until beyond 2020.89 Both the 
IMF and the World Bank have identified the no-deal scenario as a threat to financial stability 
as the uncertainty could lead to risk aversion which will affect capital flows in the market.90 
This would lead to political tensions, trade disruptions, volatile currencies, and damage 
investors’ confidence.91 Until a trade agreement is  concluded the relationship between the UK 
and the EU will be characterised by policy uncertainty. It is precisely this uncertainty that the 
IMF warns about as it makes the market more volatile. 
 
4.2 Loss of Passporting Rights 
The key immediate concern for the financial market following Brexit would be the loss of 
passporting rights. The effect of this will be felt immediately and is therefore the first issue of 
 
87 John Armour, Brexit and financial services,33 Oxf. Rev. Econ. Policy 54,56 n1 (2017) 
88 See for instance: Jennifer Rankin, Get Brexit Done'? The reality will be far more difficult and tortuous, The 
Guardian, (25 November 2019). 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/nov/25/get-brexit-done-reality-far-more-difficult-tortuous-
european-union  
Stephen Bush, How limiting EU trade deal negotiations to one year may cause problems for Boris Johnson New 
Statesman (17 December 2019). 
https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/brexit/2019/12/how-limiting-eu-trade-deal-negotiations-one-year-
may-cause-problems-boris  
89 Kate Proctor, Peter Walker and Daniel Boffey, Brexit: Boris Johnson will amend bill to outlaw extension, The 
Guardian, (17 December 2019)  
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/dec/16/boris-johnson-will-amend-brexit-bill-to-outlaw-extension  
90 IMF, Global Financial Stability Report: Vulnerabilities in a Maturing Credit Cycle, April 2019, XI 
Available online at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/GFSR/Issues/2019/03/27/Global-Financial-Stability-
Report-April-2019 
91 IMF, Supra n.90, at 10 
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major concern for financial stability. A passport is a licence for a financial institution to conduct 
business in any other Member State without need for further regulations.92 Around 5,500 UK 
firms rely on these passporting rights. Through passporting UK firms can access the Single 
Market. These require for the Member States to ensure application of the EU ‘single rulebook.’ 
Passporting rights are especially important for the wholesale financial market which covers 
derivatives, foreign exchange trading, private and public bond trading, equity trading, and 
commodities trading.93 The EU can grant regulatory equivalence which would allow UK 
financial firms to continue to operate in the same way. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) has 
promoted global regulatory equivalence as a tool to achieve financial stability.94  This process 
is not automatic; it takes time and is often politicised. This raises uncertainty for UK financial 
firms as they cannot yet anticipate when and how regulatory equivalence will be agreed.  
 
Passporting rights would not be carried over following Brexit. Only if the UK remains in the 
Single Market would passporting rights be maintained. Passporting rights are important for the 
UK financial sector but loss of these will also affect the global financial market. For instance, 
the EU investment fund, “Undertakings for the Collective Investment in Transferable 
Securities” (UCITS), which is worth around 8,000 billion euros is managed from the UK and 
half of the world’s financial firms have based their EU headquarters in the UK.95  
 
Third country institutions must apply for admission in each Member State and are subject to 
both the legislation of their home state and the host state.96 This is costly and burdensome. 
There are some exceptions to this rule in the form of regulatory equivalence. Regulatory 
equivalence would give UK financial firms some access to the Single Market. The rights are 
not as extensive as passporting rights and do no not affect all financial services. For instance, 
the scope for retail and commercial banking and primary insurers is limited.97 It is therefore 
not a perfect solution and it will leave uncertainty unless these services are covered in 
additional agreements between the UK and the EU. 
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The decision on whether to grant regulatory equivalence is taken by the EC. The EC has the 
right to withdraw equivalence at a short notice (30 days) if regulations diverge too much. The 
interpretation of ‘too much’ lies with the EC and is a political decision. As financial legislation 
is currently aligned the main issue for the UK will be that regulatory equivalence can easily be 
used as a political negotiation tool as happened for instance when Switzerland did not receive 
clearing system equivalence when it restricted the free movement of EU workers.98 The EC 
takes into account the wider circumstances, including policy concerns when making a decision 
on granting equivalence.99 This means that it is not only whether a third state meets the 
legislative criteria but also whether this decision promotes the coherence and integrity of the 
Single Market. Given that this is a political decision no legal appeal against the decision is 
possible.100 
 
The UK would still need to follow the ‘single rulebook’ (much of which is based on 
international financial agreements).101 Currently, there are 39 regulatory equivalences under 14 
different laws.102  These would all need to be followed and they are subject to change with new 
rules added on a regular base.103  Following Brexit, the UK would lose its influence on shaping 
the single-rulebook. This means that the financial interests of the City will not be represented 
within the law-making process.104 An example is that in 2011 the European Central Bank 
(ECB) decided that Euro dominated transactions should be cleared in the Eurozone. At the time 
the UK successfully appealed this policy in the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Following 
Brexit, the UK will have no influence if the EU decided to implant this policy (or any others.)105 
 
In principle there should not be a legal issue in granting the UK regulatory equivalence, given 
the current regulatory convergence. There is a risk that the equivalence process will be 
politicised in the course of the trade agreement negotiations, especially if these are not 
straightforward (and events of the last three years have proven that these negotiations are 
anything but easy).106Given the seemingly complete lack of absence of any planning for Brexit 
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in the UK there is a risk that regulatory equivalence would not be agreed and implemented in 
time before the end of the transition agreement. For instance, for Australia, Hong Kong and 
Singapore it took two years for the legislation to come into force.107 
 
The financial sector argues that loss of passporting rights will result in higher costs and higher 
risks for customers and investors108 Investment becomes more expense but also riskier because 
the flexibility of financial institutions decreases as more requirements are placed on these with 
regards to location (need to establish a presence in an EU Member State), requirements to clear 
assets in euros, and a limited access to the Single Market.  
 
The period between loss of passporting rights and regulatory equivalence is specifically a risky 
period. UK financial institutions will face significant upheaval during that time. As stated 
above the IMF warns of risk aversion from investors which leads to a more volatile financial 
market. The global significance of the UK financial market means that the effects of the higher 
risks and costs will not be restricted to the UK or even the EU but will also be globally felt. 
The longer that this uncertainty last the greater this effect will be on the financial market that 
will seek to compensate for that uncertainty through charging higher costs and a loss of 
investment. 
 
It should also be noted that EU and non-EU financial firms could also have potential difficulty 
accessing the UK financial market depending on what policies the UK will implement 
following Brexit. Therefore, firms from Member States and third countries will also face 
uncertainty as to their position in the UK financial market which is also a risk for global 
financial stability. 
 
It is unlikely that the UK will choose to throw up significant barriers for access as this would 
affect their own financial institutions disproportionally. However, there is no guarantee that no 
new rules will be adopted. Furthermore, due to the difficulties of negotiating the overarching 
Brexit framework less attention is paid by the Government and Parliament to specific sections 
of that legal framework. This means that whilst regulations that blocks access might not be 
likely, there will be regulatory gaps as there will have been no time to vote in new legislation 
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to fill these gaps. This risk can of course be addressed by immediately starting the process for 
regulatory equivalence, but that cannot be done until there is further clarity on the future legal 
framework between the UK and the EU. The main risk factors from loss of passporting rights 
are therefore the uncertainty as to the future relationship between the EU and the UK, the gaps 
to regulatory equivalence, and the politicisation of the equivalence process which means that 
there could be a delay before any legal solutions are adopted.  
 
4.3 The Financial Legal Framework 
Following the GFC, the EU introduced a significant amount of new regulations, including for 
previously unregulated organisations such as credit rating agencies and activities such as over 
the counter derivates. 109 There is now a near complete legal European framework that regulates 
financial institutions, and this will not be automatically transposed following Brexit. This 
means that there will be regulatory gaps, and this creates significant policy uncertainty which 
is a cause of financial volatility and can thus destabilise the financial market.110 . When the UK 
leaves the EU, all financial firms in the UK will be treated as located in a third country.111 This 
means that they will then be subject to the EU financial laws that apply to firms from third 
countries. This represents a significant shift for UK based financial firms and they will need to 
adjust to the changes.  
 
As discussed, most of the current legislative framework in the financial sector in the UK is part 
of the EU legal framework.112 Much of this is international in nature and based on standards 
set by International Standard Setting Bodies (ISSBs).113 Therefore, the UK is unlikely to make 
significant changes to the regulatory framework in the short term, but will roll over these 
measures as they stand. EU financial law will continue to be relevant for the UK financial 
sector after Brexit, given that financial institutions will continue to operate on both the EU and 
the UK financial market. This could enhance the regulatory burdens on companies who will 
now have to contend with EU law requirements as well as potentially divergent UK law. If UK 
law remains aligned with EU law and the law is thus harmonised there is a greater potential for 
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financial stability. Legal harmonisation is key in combatting policy uncertainty.114 The effects 
of this policy uncertainty on the financial market can already be seen. The Financial Times 
reported that $4.2b has been withdrawn from UK equity funds since May 2019 and that total 
capital outflow since the referendum is already $29.7bn and with experts agreeing that the 
uncertainty of a Brexit deal is the major contributor to this capital outflow.115 Investors are 
worried that if the UK leaves without a deal or only a perfunctory deal that leaves most policies 
to be negotiated at a later point, there will be no clarity on whether UK and EU financial law 
will continue to develop in a harmonised manner, or whether divergence will arise and if so 
what that would look like. 
 
UK financial law is thus largely composed of EU law, some of this based on transnational 
regulations. Following Brexit, it will be a monumental task to decide which obligations to carry 
over. There is a risk that regulatory gaps will appear.116 This is especially the case when one 
considers the law beyond Regulations and Directives which have been incorporated in UK 
statutory law. The EU has emitted a vast number of guidelines, notes, and other documents, 
many of which are followed by the UK or at least hold some legal authority because of their 
provenance from the EU institutions.117 When the UK leaves the EU, this legal authority 
diminishes (and their position will be less clear) and as these rules are not part of statutory law, 
they cannot be rolled over as easily. This could lead to legislative gaps. Legislative gaps and 
the diminished legal authority of EU transitional financial rules which carry no direct legal 
obligations are again a cause of policy uncertainty.  
 
The UK financial sector has sometimes raised issues with (in their eyes) the overregulation of 
EU financial service. This reflects the difference of philosophies between the more liberalised 
viewpoint of the UK and the more market regulatory viewpoint of some of the other Member 
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States (including Germany and France).118 The UK often advocates for less mandatory 
regulation.119 The UK has been able to influence the financial legal framework as a member of 
the EU but will no longer be able to do so in the same capacity when outside the EU. 
Furthermore, it will be able to draft legislation reflective of its philosophies. This could lead to 
more regulatory divergence in the future.120 The ECB has expressed its concerns that 
divergence could lead to a regulatory race to the bottom.121 Whilst deregulation could boost 
aspects of the financial sector in the short run as it will attract financial institutions, such a 
competition could in the long run affect international financial stability considerably and would 
encourage other states (in particular the EU) to limit access to their markets.122 Due to the need 
for regulatory equivalence between the UK and the EU there will likely be no significant 
divergence in the short term.123 However, due to the different approaches as discussed above 
and the difficulty of rolling over the soft law framework in its entirety it is likely that divergence 
will occur in the medium to long term. Financial stability in a globalised market requires 
coherency between national laws124  as international financial stability is dependent upon 
international cooperation.125 The FSB has identified legal fragmentation as a key risk to 
financial stability.126  
 
Therefore, there is a need to ensure that agreements following Brexit ensure close regulatory 
equivalence. This agreement, whatever shapes it takes, will not deal with the complete myriad 
of guidelines, rules, and other forms of soft law. This body of law cannot be harmonised as 
easily. Financial institutions could play a leading role by ensuring they institute harmonised 
rules and guidelines to fill in any gaps. The market can play an important role in legal 
harmonisation if this is seen as beneficial for growth. If institutions feel they can benefit from 
divergence and competition, there will be less incentive for ensuring this harmonisation. It is 
thus important that states have a strong globally harmonised regulatory framework and that no 
major gaps arise in the legislation. This also encourages institutions to cooperate so that a 
harmonised soft law framework continues to exist and develop beyond Brexit. These are long-
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term solutions and the work on these can only start after the future relationship between the 
UK and the EU is defined. There will thus likely be an uncertain period where issues have not 
been regulated and this will likely be followed by divergence in the legal framework between 
the UK and EU. This means financial firms are likely to need to adapt several times to new 
regulations which would cause further disruption.  
 
4.4 Additional Disruptive Issues 
Financial firms will need to further expand their operations to the EU Member States and 
therefore Brexit will lead to additional costs for the sector.127 Financial services could decide 
to relocate to other EU Member States.128 There is also a possibility that some firms will seek 
to relocate some of their services outside of the EU, for instance to the US.129 The EU Member 
States are not a monolith and there will be competition between states on attracting financial 
operations in an attempt to become the main financial hub of the eurozone. This is coupled 
with the risk of competitive legislation, a race to the bottom (as discussed above), whereby 
different states will try to attract as many services as possible.130 This all leads to an unstable 
situation and this could affect the confidence of investors. Risk aversion could lead to 
disinvestment in the short term as investors are likely to wait until the situation stabilises.131 
 
The UK is the main clearing hub for euros. It is unclear whether the EU will impose legislation 
that will limit the position of the UK, but it is likely there will be changes. The ECB as well as 
the French and German governments have already made statements discussing the need to 
ensure that the Eurozone should be the main clearing area for euros.132 This means that UK 
financial institutions will face restrictions on certain transactions and that they will have to shift 
operations to the Single Market. This leads to an upheaval in the market and additional costs.  
 
Whilst most of this section focused on the effects of the UK financial sector on international 
financial stability there is also the issue of how the changes will affect the EU. Research 
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indicates that the EU banking sector could be hit even worse than that of the UK.133 This is 
because of a decline in investment firms in the EU (with banks not being able to support the 
investments in the firm) and a decrease in total deposits in EU banks which makes the banking 
sector in the EU more vulnerable.134 This means that negative economic consequences of 
Brexit will be felt within the EU banking sector and lead to the EU banking sector not carrying 
the real weight of the economy, given that this will no longer be supported by the UK banking 
sector, which now plays a disproportionally large role.135 If there is no deal this will likely 
cause financial instability which will impact national economies.136  
 
4.5 Future Planning 
In 2016 the US Treasury Department warned that Brexit could be a threat to the stability of the 
US financial sector given that there will be a long period of uncertainty about the rules that 
would now govern transactions.137 In 2020 there is still the same uncertainty and a quick 
resolution seems far away. This article has not discussed the impact of Brexit on the economy 
as a whole as this is beyond its scope. It is clear that the economy of both the UK and the 
Member States could be severely impacted by Brexit.138 This would also affect the financial 
sector.  
 
Not all sections of the financial sector will be equally affected by Brexit. Most at risk are the 
sections which are the most globalised. These would include wholesale banking, investment 
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banking, and derivatives clearing.139 At risk are especially non-EU headquartered banks that 
have a UK subsidiary to ensure EU passporting rights (around 14% of the UK banking 
sector).140 These would no longer have a reason to be in the UK and would likely relocate to a 
Member State.141 The banking sector would thus be impacted, especially given the limited 
regulatory equivalence that exists for retail and commercial banking.142 For other sectors such 
as wholesale financial transactions there likely will be more intensive competition from for 
instance the United States.143 
 
The UK and the EU have already taken some specific measures to avoid disruption to the 
financial market such as the recent activation of currency swap arrangements between the Bank 
of England and the ECB to underpin market liquidity. The EU has adopted time-limited 
equivalence decisions for UK central counterparties and central securities depositaries. These 
types of solutions should be further encouraged but it would be important to ensure these fit in 
an overarching legal framework and are not just temporary stopgaps.  
 
This section discussed the potential effects of Brexit on global financial stability. These effects 
are closely linked to uncertainty. The key short-term risk is the loss of passporting rights 
(especially if there is not immediately a lack of regulatory equivalence) and the key long-term 
risk is legal divergence which works against financial stability as the latter benefits from legal 
harmonisation. Policy uncertainty is a net contributor to financial instability, even to eclipse 
the actual financial volatility event itself. 144 In the UK this effect could be observed following 
the Brexit referendum and is likely to continue, even in the medium term.145 The Withdrawal 
Agreement only concerns the transition period and a further trade deal still needs to be 
negotiated. 146 Therefore, the continued uncertainty represents a risk to international financial 
stability. This is aggravated by the politicisation of the process which leads to further delays in 
establishing long term policy. The UK and the EU will need to come to an agreement on the 
financial sector as soon as possible and it is important that such an agreement is comprehensive, 
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in alignment with international developments, focused not just on the EU and the UK but also 
taking into account the global financial market in order to foster stability, and is aimed at 
maintaining legal harmonisation.  
  
5. Emerging Market Economies –Key Issues for Financial Stability 
 
5.1 Introductory Issues 
This final part analyses key risks in emerging market economies (EME) that could threaten 
global financial stability, and which have not yet been sufficiently recognised by policy makers 
and analysts. The literature has concentrated mainly on the effects of global financial markets 
on EME and has not analysed how key issues that specifically affect EME would affect global 
financial stability. This section analyses several of these other issues: specifically, unstable 
trade policies from major players like the USA, (a perception) of domestic policy uncertainty 
leading to sudden changes in capital flow, and high foreign currency debts leaving the market 
more vulnerable to changes in international financial markets. Whilst the effects of these issues 
on the domestic financial markets in EME have been discussed, there is no in-depth analysis 
on how in turn this could affect global financial stability. This section will thus analyse how 
these issues destabilise domestic financial markets in EME from the perspective of how this 
affects global financial stability.  
 
EME can be defined as low income countries that have a fast pace of development and a 
government favouring economic liberalisation policies.147 They have diverse economic 
environments, but instability is a common factor.148 As the economies develop further, they 
become more entwined with the international financial market. The ECB has stated that 
compared to two decades ago, EME play a significantly more prominent role in the global 
economy.149 They now account for more than half of global GDP (at purchasing power parity) 
and gross capital flows.150 Thus there now more risk of EME affecting global financial stability 
because of their larger role in the international economy. EME and advanced economies share 
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many similar vulnerabilities that could put international financial stability at risk. EME are 
highly volatile and investment in EME is characterised as high risk by financial institutions.151 
This means that EME are more vulnerable to policy uncertainty and this can potentially have a 
rippling effect on the global financial market.  
 
Whereas previously a financial crisis affecting advance economies would strongly affect 
emerging economies but far less so the other way around, this is no longer the case.  Because 
of the economic growth of EME threats to financial stability now also flow from EME to 
advanced economies and it is important that policy makers worldwide have appropriate tools 
to monitor and understand these risks.152 This is especially so in relation to those risks to which 
EME are especially vulnerable in comparison to advanced economies.  
 
Obviously, the topic of EME is vast and this article does not include a complete discussion on 
all issues related to financial stability and EME. It only seeks to highlight several key issues 
that could affect global financial stability. Furthermore, EME are a diverse group of countries 
all over the world. It is clear that different factors are at play in each of these economies. This 
section thus concentrates on several risks common to EME that could threaten international 
financial stability.   
 
5.2 Trade Policy 
Both the World Bank and the IMF have identified trade tensions with the US as a potential risk 
to worldwide financial stability.153 US trade policy is important for the global financial market 
because of the size of its economy and the role of the dollar as the global reserve currency. 
Growth of global trade has slowed significantly in recent years.154 This is mainly due to 
changes in trade policy. The overall rise in protectionism has led to the integration of 
international trade slowing down.155 In itself this does not necessarily threaten financial 
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stability. However as discussed in previous sections, for the financial market to be stable, policy 
certainty is key. Whilst this is a global threat it is more likely to affect EME because they are 
less shock-resistant to policy uncertainties because of domestic policy uncertainty and they are 
more vulnerable to sudden changes in capital flow.156 
 
The trade policy of the US has become more volatile in recent years. Policies of the current 
administration are difficult to predict and anticipate. This could affect stability because it is 
hard for financial institutions to predict effects of a policy if there is no clarity on what that 
policy will be. Especially the trade tensions between the US and China have the possibility of 
affecting financial stability given the size of the Chinese economy. This is even more of an 
issue because of the financial fluctuations in China’s economy and the currently less 
predictable and more unstable growth of the Chinese economy.157 The lack of a consistent trade 
policy makes it difficult to adjust and this creates uncertainty among both states and businesses. 
Whilst the exact effects are difficult to predict, the financial market reacts to changes in trade 
policy. For instance, the optimism about negotiations between China and the US were one of 
the causes of the rebound of the financial market at the start of 2019.158 
 
Under the current US administration led by President Trump, the approach to global trade is 
characterised by further protectionism and frequent policy changes that are more political than 
economic in nature. This has, for instance, resulted in the imposition of higher trade tariffs on 
an assortment of goods (including steel and aluminium) and on goods from certain states 
(notably China). Of course, trading partners respond to these changes by levying their own 
tariffs. Trade policy is used as a political tool. In June 2019 the Trump Administration 
threatened to impose 5% tariffs on Mexican imports unless Mexico stopped migrants from 
crossing the US southern border. If Mexico did not respond the tariffs would go up to 25% by 
October 2019.159 Clearly, these tariffs serve no economic purpose and were meant as a political 
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to cause unrest on the market as the decisions are unpredictable and there is no economic logic 
behind them.  
 
The attitude of the Trump Administration towards international trade is that of a zero-sum, 
adversarial approach, where there is a winner and a loser.160  As evidenced by the refusal of 
the Trump Administration to nominate candidates to the appellate dispute resolution body of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the attacks on the North America Free Trade 
Association (NAFTA) and the support of Brexit there is a mistrust within the Administration 
for the organisations that seek to regulate international trade. If the US operates mainly outside 
of the confines of the international institutions their policy becomes less predictable. The US 
could use the size of its economy to push for more advantageous, less balanced trade deals with 
other states which could diminish the flow of capital between states, and states with emerging 
markets are more vulnerable to this.161 The operation of the Trump Administration outside 
institutional confines threatens economic stability because these organisations provide 
mechanisms to limit the effect on shocks to the financial market.162 This could also weaken the 
position of the IMF which is an institution that promotes economic growth and financial 
stability.163 Trading outside the bounds of international institutions which are characterised by 
a rule-based approach to trade means a less structured, more volatile, and less predictable 
approach to international trade. This could particularly affect EME who on average have less 
financial resilience to cope with changing policies and who have on average weaker domestic 
institutions that could not take over the role that international institutions currently fulfil.   
 
Haley discusses how trade agreements (bilateral and multilateral) often have currency 
manipulation clauses which push out IMF policy and how these clauses put smaller economies 
at a disadvantage as they would have more to lose in case of a dispute that threatens the flow 
of trade.164 Possible effects could include businesses deciding to diminish their exports or not 
entering foreign markets at all.165  
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Information asymmetry is a key obstacle for well-functioning and stable financial system as 
information flows interfere with the financial system and this ‘can then no longer perform its 
function of mobilising savings, facilitating the exchange of goods and services, reducing risks 
and allocating resources to productive sectors.’166 This points to the importance of reliable 
information to inform state policy and to inform decisions made by financial firms. A volatile 
trade policy encourages information asymmetry and would thus be a risk factor for states 
(which cannot predict changes in trade policy as easily) and for financial firms (which have no 
reliable information to inform their decisions).   
 
If trade tensions escalate further this could lead to eroding confidence in the global economy.167 
Model based simulations from the IMF and the ECB indicate that the escalation of trade 
tensions causes additional financial stress on the market.168 The market cannot predict the 
changes in policy and risk aversive investors will be slower to invest and quicker to withdraw 
funds. Depending on how predicable and sudden the changes are this can affect international 
financial stability. EME are more vulnerable to these sudden changes because of several 
factors: they have less ability to cope with changes in trade policy as their infrastructure is less 
developed, their financial markets are characterised by high foreign currency debts which 
makes them more vulnerable to changes in the global economy, and investors are already more 
risk averse when it comes to EME. If trade policy tensions destabilise the financial market this 
disproportionally affects EME which in turn can affect global financial stability. 
 
5.3 The Flow of Capital 
A second important risk to financial stability in EME is a sudden change in capital flows. To 
further develop the financial market in EME capital flow across borders is encouraged. 
However, capital flow also brings risk to financial stability.169 It leaves the economy more 
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vulnerable to external shocks and this can have a cumulative effect on global financial 
stability.170 If an economy has limited exposure to international capital flows the economy is 
less at risk to external shocks and volatility is low.171 The lack of integration with the wider 
financial market ensures a cushion against global financial instability and provides a barrier 
against domestic financial instability affecting the international financial market. As the capital 
flows across borders with EME have grown these have become more vulnerable to financial 
instability. EME are particularly vulnerable to changes in capital flow if they also have low 
reserves, high leverage, or high foreign currency exposures.172 The liberalisation of the 
financial markets in EME has led to their further integration in the international financial 
market.173 The merits of this further integration have been analysed and there is no clear definite 
answer on how beneficial this is.174 This discussion falls beyond the scope of this article but 
suffice to say that the further liberalisation and integration of EME has led to increased capital 
flows and that this creates a greater risk to global and domestic financial stability. 
 
In 2011 the flow of capital to EME was $910 billion compared to $149 billion in 2002.175 This 
means the markets are now closer linked and therefore an internal financial crisis risks affecting 
other financial markets. The IMF identified that concerns about policy credibility of EME 
could cause significant capital outflow which is a risk to financial stability.176 Policy credibility 
means that investors trust that the domestic policies of a country are designed to protect their 
investments. Investors can perceive EME financial policies as arbitrary and not necessarily 
working for their best interest.177 This is partly due to the high volatility of the economy and 
partly because of the transitional state of EME which means that the political and economic 
landscape is perpetually changing and policy is thus in  a constant state of flux.178 Investors 
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cannot anticipate the policies in an effective manner, and this increases investment risks. This 
is coupled with the perception that policies are more corrupt in EME which decreases 
transparency, raises business costs, and makes investors wary.179 This can especially 
discourage long-term investments.180 This makes the economy and the financial market of 
EME more unstable. The high volatility of EME is partly caused by this domestic policy 
instability which can hamper economic growth and lead to more abrupt changes in capital 
flow.181   
 
A financial crisis can suddenly diminish the flow of capital to the affected country and even 
the whole region.182 Whilst there is a significant linkage between capital flows and financial 
stability there is no conclusive evidence on how this linkage works.183 Not all capital flows are 
as vulnerable to external factors during financial crises: dollar debts are more vulnerable than 
local currency debts and equity portfolio investments for instance.184 The influence on banking 
flows and portfolios is also much stronger than on Foreign Direct Investment.185 Drivers of 
capital flow vary across components and should therefore be categorised to understand where 
the economy is particularly vulnerable.186 This makes it difficult to have effective regulation 
to counter the risks. Some of the financial factors that play a role in this linkage: the size of the 
banking sector, the credit to deposit ratio, and the liquid assets to deposit ratio, and macro-
economic factors such as real GDP per capital, trade openness, rate of inflation, and the 
exchange rate regime.187 The effects also vary per country so there is a risk if EME are treated 
as an entity that the regulations are not effective given the different concerns that exist in 
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individual states.188 The lack of trust in the resilience and policy of EME (discussed above) 
encourages further capital flow to advanced economies if these are perceived as more stable.189 
 
Risk aversion and policy uncertainty play a key role in decisions to invest.190 EME are 
especially vulnerable to this as EME assets are generally seen as high-risk investments.191 Thus 
in times of a (potential) crisis investors are more likely to divest and search lower risk 
investments elsewhere (even if these have a lower return) and this makes capital flows more 
volatile. 
 
Benchmark driven investors are more sensitive (three to five times compared to other investor 
streams) to changes in global financial conditions.192 An investment fund is benchmark driven 
when ‘portfolio allocation across countries is guided by the country weights in a benchmark 
index.’193 As benchmark driven investors now have a larger share of the portfolio market (this 
quadrupled in the past ten years) this could lead to sudden changes in capital flow.194 The 
inclusion of EME in  the benchmark indices gives them accessibility to more and more diverse 
finance but EME are also more vulnerable to the common factors included in the indexes, 
which tend to treat EME as a class rather than being country specific.195 The result is that the 
flow of capital can change drastically regardless of how well the internal economy is doing. 
EME are more vulnerable to changes in capital flow because they are more dependent on the 
availability of foreign capital than advanced economies.196 If the flow of capital diminishes this 
undermines the banking system and industries which affects the economy.197 This thus leaves 
the country at risk to financial destabilisation. Given the further integration of the EME with 
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Short-term foreign currency debt is another issue that leaves EME vulnerable.198 Exchange 
rates and interest rates can diverge which creates a more volatile market. The use of risky 
external finance instruments such as foreign currency denominated debts create a risk to 
stability.199 Individual investors take the risk to the economy as a given because of the short-
term profits these instruments engender. There is little reason for an individual investor to not 
use these instruments if everyone else does. This would thus ask for international regulatory 
intervention that leads to more harmonised law across states.200 High external debt and weak 
reserve coverage levels cause vulnerability to external shocks which has an effect on global 
financial stability.201 This risk is diminished because few countries have a high public debt and 
a high foreign currency debt (Lebanon, Tunisia, Ukraine are examples of countries which do) 
and most countries with high public debt (including large economies such as Brazil and India) 
have a low foreign currency debt.202 This is thus less likely to represent a risk to global financial 
stability. The countries that are especially vulnerable are smaller economies and any internal 
crisis is not likely to have a significant effect on the global financial market. 
 
5.4 Building Policy 
 
Compared to twenty years ago, many EMEs have reduced their external vulnerabilities and 
improved their policy frameworks significantly. A large proportion of EMEs have adopted 
inflation-targeting monetary policy frameworks, which help to anchor inflation expectations 
and stabilise business cycles.  The domestic banking sector in EME has grown so there is more 
domestic credit available.203 The IMF recommends that EME implement policies that provide 
further resilience against changes in the capital flow, but warns against the extensive use of 
capital flow management  except in times of a (near) crisis as this can lead to the exclusion 
from certain benchmark indices which would also affect the (domestic) financial market.204 
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Whilst because of the regulatory changes EME are more resilient against a global financial 
crisis their further integration in the international financial market also means that they can 
affect the global financial market more. EME markets are more volatile, and this is a risk for 
global financial stability. EME are more vulnerable to changes in capital flows because of their 
dependence on foreign currency and because investment in EME is considered more high risk. 
Thus, the capital flows are more volatile and sudden changes can affect the (domestic) financial 
market.  
 
Uncertainty in trade policy and flow of capital are directly linked. If trade policy is uncertain 
and especially in a political climate where a trade war does not seem far away, firms could 
make the choice to shift their portfolios to ‘safer’ currencies and investments.205 The current 
trade tensions might escalate further, but this is difficult to predict and this will make investors 
more careful. These tensions could thus have a direct effect on capital flows and would 
disproportionally affect EME. 
 
The heightened interconnectedness between the national and the global financial market for 
EME means that it is key to stabilise domestic financial markets to ensure international 
financial stability. Therefore, the goal should be the stabilisation of capital flow to a similar 
degree as in advanced economies. To do so investment must be considered to have the same 
risk as in advanced economies. One of the key elements for this stability is whether the country 
is perceived as willing and capable to repay its debts.206 Furthermore, policy certainty that 
promotes transparency and clarity for investors is important to reduce the high-risk investment 
perception. This encourages investment and ensures less volatile capital flows. To accomplish 




Ten years after the GFC the international regulatory financial framework is far more robust 
and resilient to shocks due to the introduction of new legislation. It was identified that failures 
in supervision and lack of regulation were an important cause of the crisis. This led to a 
significant amount of legislation which all supported the goal of furthering financial stability 
 
205 Gunnella, Supra n.155. 
206 Suk-Joong Kim, Sovereign credit ratings, capital flows and financial sector development in Emerging 
markets, 9 Emerg. Markets Rev.17, 20 (2008). 
44 
 
so that a global financial crisis will be less likely to occur. Nevertheless, different factors could 
threaten this financial stability. This article has highlighted three of these factors: fintech, 
Brexit, and emerging markets. These risks are addressed from different perspectives, but the 
perspective of global financial stability is lacking in the literature. Whilst all three of these 
factors have different causes and potential effects, they also share some key commonalities. 
They all three arose post the financial crisis and are thus new factors that are underregulated 
and cause significant policy uncertainty that could lead to changes in the financial landscape, 
including sudden shifts in capital flow.  All three of these risks are currently modest but have 
the potential to evolve very quickly and therefore a legal response is needed, in order to be 
proactive rather than reactive. Policy made to address these issues should take into 
consideration the importance of global financial stability and factor in how any regulation 
would affect this.  
 
The fintech sector is still small but is experiencing exponential growth. It will therefore 
increasingly become a significant factor on the international financial market. Currently, there 
is only minimal regulation in place. The existing laws are domestic and there is no international 
harmonisation. The lack of a coherent international legal framework forms a potential threat to 
financial stability. The lack of legal harmonisation leads to policy uncertainty and gaps in the 
legislation that can be exploited by financial operators. The quick growth of the sector could 
quickly aggravate the risks to international financial stability as this could lead to unpredictable 
changes in the international financial market.  
 
The process of the UK exiting the EU does not need to lead to an instable financial market in 
and of itself. However, the continued uncertainty regarding the future agreements between the 
EU and the UK, and the influence of (party) politics which makes decisions less predictable 
could cause significant issues on the global financial market. Regulatory equivalence will be 
an ongoing process, legal divergence will occur in the longer term, and the lack of policy 
certainty and transparency can lead to sudden changes in the financial market and in capital 
flows.  
 
EME are a diverse group of countries but share a more volatile economy which is more 
vulnerable to sudden shifts in capital flows. This is coupled with policy uncertainty and a 
perception of corruption and lack of transparency. Investors therefore regard EME as high-risk 
investments and fuelled by uncertainty are more likely to move capital when there are tensions 
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on the market, such as the tensions surrounding international trade policy, especially with 
regards to the unpredictability of US trade policy. As EME have grown they have become more 
important for the global economy and more entwined with the international financial market. 
Therefore, fluctuations on domestic markets are likely to affect the global financial market.  
 
From the above the conclusion can be made that a pattern emerges whereby policy uncertainty 
leads to more wariness from investors which could lead to sudden changes in capital flows 
which further destabilise the markets. Gaps in regulation regarding changes in the structure of 
the financial market can aggravate risks to international financial stability. This article 
contributed to understanding why fintech, Brexit, and EME threaten global financial stability 
and why it is therefore key that this aspect is taken into account when policy is drafted. Whilst 
the concrete solutions for all three of these risks would differ it is clear that further legal 
harmonisation leading to a unified global legal framework for the financial market is necessary. 
Legal harmonisation counters policy uncertainty, diminishes regulatory gaps between 
countries, diminishes the risks for investors, counters sudden significant changes in capital 
flow, and allows for more policy transparency. Therefore, ideally these risks would be 
addressed at the international level with input from different stakeholders, including banks and 
other financial institutions. At the very least domestic policy makers should take into account 
international developments when drafting legislation that addresses these challenges.  
 
From the analysis it becomes clear that smaller legislative issues can have a potentially 
destabilising effect on the global financial market and that it is therefore important to address 
these issues early on. As can be observed from these three issues there is a tendency for policy 
makers and politicians to address other more immediate needs first and only focus on financial 
stability once the potential threat emerges and is no longer only potential. Furthermore, there 
is a real risk that new policy is politicised. Examples mentioned in this article include how the 
European Commission has handled passporting rights by using it to gain leverage and how the 
US is using trade policy to gain concessions in other areas. This makes policy less predictable 
for financial institutions which leads to a more volatile market that is reactive instead of pro-
active. Therefore, a case can be made for more technical law making at the international level, 
involving financial institutions and actors, international organisations, and other experts that 
can draft conventions and other legislation. This would ensure more predictable policy that 




Whilst this article concentrated on fintech, Brexit, and EME, it also leads to a broader 
understanding on how policy issues affect global financial stability. The commonalities of the 
regulatory challenges discussed here have a more universal application: as policy uncertainty 
emerges as a root cause it is important that legislators address issues of global financial stability 
early on to ensure that no legislative gaps emerge, and new policy is predictable for financial 
actors.  
 
